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Changing Social Security to Achieve Long-Term 
Solvency and Make Other Improvements – 
Background Factors, Issues, Options* 
Peter W. Martin** 
Introduction 
For years those responsible for Social Security and policy analysts have 
acknowledged that the present statutory framework for determining and financing 
program benefits is unsustainable. The underlying factors are not a matter of dispute. 
An apparently permanent shift in the ratio of individuals of working age paying into 
the system to those receiving benefits from it constitutes the principal cause. Because 
of a demographic bulge (the “baby boom”) this change is occurring fairly abruptly. A 
drop from roughly three covered workers per beneficiary to two per beneficiary began 
in 2010 and will be complete around 2020. The nation’s declining birth rate has 
reduced the relative number of workers paying in, even as increased longevity is 
exanding the population of beneficiaries. Retirees are living significantly longer than 
in 1983 when Congress last adjusted the program’s key parameters. In sum, as is true 
of other economically developed countries, the U.S. population is aging. That carries 
direct funding challenges for Social Security, Medicare, and most other mechanisms, 
public and private, designed to support those in retirement. 
Figure 11 
 
Other demographic and economic conditions have, over time, diverged significantly 
from assumptions that informed details of Social Security’s architecture. Some of 
these changes have also increased program costs or reduced revenues, adding to the 
long-term sustainability problem. For example, earnings inequality has increased 
dramatically. As a result, an ever larger fraction of U.S. earnings exceed the income 
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range upon which the Social Security payroll tax is imposed. Other developments 
with less clear fiscal impact have nonetheless produced results that seem quite at odds 
with those originally intended. Some raise serious issues of fairness or adequacy. As 
explored in greater detail below, Social Security’s spouse benefits remain an 
important feature for women, notwithstanding the steady climb in female labor force 
participation. Yet a structure that channels non-contributory benefits to spouses, and 
more particularly spouses in marriages that exist in old age, whether or not of long 
duration, and divorced spouses whose marriages spanned at least ten years, seems less 
and less congruent with U.S. patterns of work and family composition. An even more 
clearly obsolete element is Social Security’s special minimum benefit. Designed to 
provide minimally adequate amounts to workers retiring after a lifetime of low wages, 
it was indexed to prices. Since the standard benefit formula rises with average 
earnings, this alternative benefit formula has been rendered almost entirely valueless.2 
Yet the standard formula, when applied to the earnings history of a steadily employed, 
low wage worker, produces benefits well below the poverty line.3 
Long ago, the discussion among experts about Social Security’s fiscal problem, 
amplified by political debate over its dimensions and possible solutions, began to 
impinge on public consciousness, sapping the confidence of those paying into the 
system. Periodic Gallup surveys show that in recent years a majority of current 
workers have come to believe that Social Security benefits will no longer be there 
when their time to retire arrives, with this concern being particularly acute among 
individuals18 to 34 years old. 
Figure 24 
 
Nonetheless, despite the work of Presidential commissions,5 countless Congressional 
hearings, proposals for reform advanced by individuals and groups across the political 
spectrum, changes to Social Security that would restore its fiscal balance into the 
foreseeable future have repeatedly been deferred or deflected by the nation’s law-
makers. This postponement of solution is itself a matter of concern. For over a 
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decade, the Social Security Advisory Board6 has urged prompt action to restore 
Social Security’s long-term solvency. As its 2010 report “Social Security: Why 
Action Should Be Taken Soon” explains, delay results in ever more constricted 
options, continued erosion of public confidence in the program, increased economic 
instability, and diminished opportunity for spreading the impact of necessary changes 
over time and across age groups.7 
Failure to act has also eroded Social Security’s capacity to weather recession. The 
Social Security Trustees Report submitted to Congress in April 2007 painted the system’s 
short-term future as secure.8 Unforeseen economic events rapidly changed that picture. A 
massive decline in employment cut into the program’s principal revenue source, the 
earmarked taxes paid on earnings by employers and employees. Declining interest rates 
reduced a second important source of funds, the interest paid on the U.S. Treasury bonds 
held by the two Social Security trust funds. And benefit applications increased. Finding 
themselves without employment, older individuals who had not planned to retire so soon 
applied for Social Security. Jobless individuals who had previously managed to work 
despite severe medical problems applied for Disability Insurance, as just they had in 
earlier periods of economic contraction. 
Figure 3: The Effect of Recessions on Disability Insurance9 
I
By 2011 the trustees were forced to report the likelihood that the assets of the Disability 
Insurance (DI) Trust Fund would be exhausted by 2018.10 Their 2012 report brought that 
date forward to 2016.11 The 2012 report also estimated that the Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, while able during the short term to cover both that 
program’s costs and the shortfall in DI, would in 2016 have assets totalling one-third less 
than the trustees had projected before the recession, a reduction of over $1.5 trillion.12 
Total Social Security benefits paid out in 2010 were $17.3 billion more than had been 
forecast in 2007; program revenues were $153.9 billion less.13 It should, perhaps, be 
added that none of that revenue decline was a consequence of the two percent payroll tax 
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holiday enacted as a stimulus measure for 2011 and subsequently extended through 2012. 
Since the effectuating legislation authorized compensating transfers from general revenues 
and made no change in the earnings levels on which future benefits would be calculated 
these temporary tax reductions had no direct fiscal impact on Social Security.14 
This paper aims to assist analysis of and reflection on the range of options for 
ensuring Social Security’s future while avoiding the addition of yet another solvency 
proposal to the already ample supply. It begins with several background observations. 
These are followed by a discussion of personal (or private) accounts to which former 
President George W. Bush gave salience and which continue to be included among the 
talking points of politicians hostile to Social Security’s historic structure. Next the paper 
reviews the more likely program changes that would (unlike personal accounts) directly 
address Social Security’s long-term “deficit.” That section is followed by one sketching 
possible revisions in the program’s benefit structure designed to achieve ends other than 
reducing Social Security expenditures. The paper concludes with some observations on 
the role that framing has played in past debates over Social Security’s future. Finally, 
there is an appendix explaining the central terms and components of the current program. 
It is provided for readers who might otherwise be unclear about the meaning or 
implications of changing Social Security’s “Primary Insurance Amount” formula or its 
“Full Retirement Age.” 
I. Important Background Points 
A. Achieving sustainability 
For years the standard actuarial analysis employed in Social Security’s annual 
trustees’ reports has revealed a large long-term deficit. Over the past decade and a half 
these successive seventy-five year projections placed the size of that deficit at around 
2% of taxable earnings.15 The two most recent reports have increased the estimate – 
to 2.22% in 2011, 2.67% in 2012.16 In other words, achieving balance or solvency 
measured this way would, roughly speaking, require raising annual revenue over the 
figure generated under current law by an amount equivalent to adding the estimated 
percentage to the payroll tax rate immediately and permanently or cutting program costs by 
that amount or some combination of the two, over the next seventy-five years. An asserted 
failure of vision in the last iteration of Social Security reform, which took place roughly 
three decades ago, is that it did not escape this definition of solvency. The 
“sustainability” critique points toward an even more distant time horizon or at least 
analysis of the revenue-cost dynamic toward the end of the conventional seventy-five 
year period. Program revenue and benefits can be in balance when viewed against a 
fixed number of years, so the argument goes, but, if at the end of that period costs are 
climbing and revenues shrinking, identical projections done a year or two later will show a 
deficit. Diamond and Orszag (see I.F below) refer to this as the “terminal-year problem.”17  
Enacting a Social Security tax rate increase of 2.67% (split between employees and 
employers) would achieve actuarial balance, as traditionally measured, but according 
to the trustees’ 2012 report it would not produce sustainability for their projections 
reveal “the program’s financial condition … worsening” at the end of the seventy-five 
year period.18 
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Social Security is close to unique among government programs in having built into its 
legislation such a mechanism for regular exposure and review of projected future 
expenditures and consequent revenue requirements. Furthermore, its dedicated funding 
base brings a rare discipline to that analysis. As noted below, Medicare poses more 
serious long-term fiscal challenges, but the two parts of Medicare that threaten most 
explosive growth (Parts B and D, the latter being the drug benefit program that took 
effect in January of 2006) are, according to that program’s trustees report for 2012, 
adequately funded. How can that be said? Medicare Parts B and D (unlike Medicare 
Part A and Social Security) are funded by a draw on general revenues and premiums 
paid by the population it covers. Those parts of Medicare can be said to be in fiscal balance 
because the governing legislation allows the trustees to assume that transfers from 
general revenues and premiums will continue to increase automatically, year by year, 
covering that year’s costs, no matter how high they climb.19 Is Medicare in fiscal 
balance? Technically, yes; realistically and sustainably, no. For seven years in a row the 
size of Medicare’s reliance on general revenues has forced the trustees to issue a statutory 
“Medicare funding warning.”20 
B. The importance of acting sooner rather than later 
Social Security is less than eighty years old. What grounds are there for imagining 
that today’s projections of how the program’s present framework will function over the 
next seventy-five years will be any more accurate than those underlying the original 
legislation or more recent revisions? Annual trustees’ reports not only caution about the 
uncertainties underlying their actuarial figures, but routinely represent a range of possible 
futures by offering not one but three long-term projections. 21 While the one labeled 
“intermediate” commands greatest attention, the most recent report also contains a “low-
cost” or optimistic projection which shows the program as very close to actuarial balance, 
as well as a truly bleak “high-cost” one.22 A 2004 Congressional Budget Office projection of 
Social Security expenditures and revenues23 estimated a much smaller long-term deficit 
than the program trustees were, at the time, projecting, further illustrating the degree of 
speculation involved in predicting the effects of economic and demographic changes 
across three-quarters of a century. 
Any number of events or forces, ranging from changes in immigration policy to 
economic collapse, wars or pandemics, could change Social Security’s future in 
defiance of today’s best estimates. Social Security has been deeply affected by 
economic and social changes that were invisible to forecasters in 1935, 1950, and even 
1983.24 Surely, the most carefully crafted contemporary reforms will similarly confront 
unforeseen challenges. Does this recommend a “wait and see” approach? The short 
answer is “no.” It is one thing for Congress to attempt to legislate responsibly for 
Social Security’s future, with realistic acknowledgment that future developments will 
invariably require future adjustments, quite another to fail to legislate even though the best 
forecasts indicate a large future problem. On the other hand, because of the certainty of 
unforeseen challenges it is important that Social Security reform be made within a 
framework that is, while stable (not requiring constant legislative adjustment), not so 
rigid as to make future revision unnecessarily arbitrary or politically difficult. 
Why not wait to act until Social Security’s fiscal shortfall is closer at hand so that its 
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dimensions will, presumably, be more clearly visible? As the Comptroller General 
explained to a Committee of Congress over a decade ago, two powerful reasons not to 
wait are intergenerational equity and adequate forewarning: 
While the crisis is not immediate, it is important to act soon if we are to avoid 
having to unfairly burden future generations with the program’s rising costs and 
give these individuals time to make necessary adjustments to their retirement 
planning.25 
Assuming that solvency requires downward adjustment of the program’s benefit formula 
and higher taxes in some combination, the greater the delay in implementation, the more 
that burden will be concentrated on younger workers and future cohorts of beneficiaries, 
with those who fall in both categories taking a double hit. Of course, the 
intergenerational equity point applies, with equal force, to Medicare, the national debt 
and U.S. trade imbalance, exploitation of natural resources, and a myriad other issues. It 
is simply more evident with Social Security because of the way the program is structured. 
C. The relationship between the Social Security reserve and the 
federal deficit 
The reform package recommended by the Greenspan Commission and enacted by 
Congress in 1983 avoided the then-quite-imminent Social Security insolvency with a 
package of tax increases and long-term benefit reductions. As intended, these resulted 
in a prolonged period of growing surplus or reserves. That growth continues. The 
1983 amendments represented a modest shift from “pay as you go” to “advance” 
funding. Despite proposals to put the Social Security reserves in a “lockbox” or take them 
off the federal budget the temptation to use them to reduce the apparent size of the 
federal deficit during the presidencies of Reagan and the Bushes, both senior and junior, 
and to increase the apparent size of the budget surplus under Clinton proved irresistible. 
As a consequence, on top of all the debt the Federal Government now owes third 
parties, it owes the Social Security trust funds over $2.6 trillion.26 (During 2011 $114.4 
billion, over 14% of program revenue, came from interest payments on that debt.)27 This 
indebtedness will climb by several hundred million dollars until a year or two or three after 
2020 when annual program costs will begin to exceed annual program revenue.28 At that 
point, as the director of the Congressional Budget Office noted in testimony before the 
Senate Special Committee on Aging in February 2005: “The Social Security system will 
... have to redeem the government bonds held in its trust funds. But where will the 
Treasury find the money to pay for those bonds? Will policymakers cut back other 
spending in the budget? Will they raise taxes? Or will they borrow more?” Having used 
the Social Security surplus for decades to support other expenditures the Federal 
Government will have to begin “repaying” that debt.29 
One of the asserted advantages of personal accounts invested in the private sector is that 
advance funding in that form will not present future Congresses with the temptation to 
make temporary use of the assets for other purposes. That argument rests at bottom on 
claims about psychology and politics, not law. 
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D. What happens if Congress does nothing? 
The Social Security Act itself appropriates the funds for Social Security benefits. 
There is no need for the Social Security Administration to secure appropriations year by year 
to cover benefits. (By contrast, expenditures on the program’s administration, although 
funded from the very same source, the trust funds established by 42 U.S.C. § 401, are 
subject to annual Congressional approval.) Concerns about imbalance between program 
revenue and benefit commitments are dealt with primarily through procedural devices 
designed to alert Congress to any problem. The most important of these is the annual 
report by the program trustees called for by 41 U.S.C. § 401(c). Section 401 also authorizes 
inter-fund borrowing as a short-term solution (e.g., the Disability Insurance trust fund can 
borrow from the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance fund and vice versa). See 42 
U.S.C. § 401(l). In addition, the mechanism in 42 U.S.C. § 415 for annual cost-of-
living benefit increases shifts from price to wage indexing, if that yields a lower 
figure, when the "fund ratio" drops too low. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i). 
There is nothing in the Act that provides for scaling back benefits so that they match 
revenues. The apparent assumption is that before that became necessary Congress, having 
been forewarned by the trustees and the chief actuary, would make appropriate 
adjustments (as it has in the past). Should Congress do nothing and the trust funds 
experience cash flow embarrassment, the Social Security Administration would have no 
legal authority to pay benefits beyond the sums flowing in. In the absence of further 
Congressional direction through amendment to the Act, what the agency would be 
authorized to do in shaping benefit payments to inadequate revenue is an open 
question.30 
E. The comparatively greater challenge posed by Medicare  
The 2012 Trustees Report on Medicare summarized that program’s future as follows: 
Total Medicare expenditures were $549 billion in 2011. The Board projects 
that, under current law, expenditures will increase in future years at a 
somewhat faster pace than either aggregate workers’ earnings or the economy 
overall and that, as a percentage of GDP, they will increase from 3.7 percent in 
2011 to 6.7 percent by 2086 (based on the Trustees’ intermediate set of 
assumptions).31  
It noted further that this projection rested on the unrealistic assumption that the 
scheduled decrease in physician fees, which Congress had regularly overridden, 
would finally occur. The estimate also assumed, the report noted, that the cost 
reduction effects promised by the Affordable Care Act would be realized. The trustees 
estimated that should those two assumptions prove unsound Medicare costs would 
increase to 10.4 percent of GDP by 2086.32 (That is roughly the percentage of GDP 
generated by the federal income tax since 1985.)33 
Comparable projections of Social Security show it rising from its current level (4% - 
5% GDP) to 6% or so seventy-five years out.34 
F. One framework for analysis and comparison 
A book by Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag, published in 2004,35 provides a useful 
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framework for approaching these issues: It not only offers thorough analysis of the 
Social Security financing challenge, but suggests ways of thinking about how best to 
share the burden of meeting it. That framework leads the authors to propose a three-part 
plan containing a balance of revenue increases and “benefit adjustments.” Two closely 
related factors that shape the Diamond-Orszag plan are the increased and continually 
increasing life expectancy for seniors and the substantial inequality within that increase 
(much greater longevity improvement for high income than for low income workers). 
The authors do not favor benefit adjustment in the form of further shifts in the “Full 
Retirement Age” as some others have. Instead they propose automatically reducing the 
prospective Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) formula for those 59 and younger each 
year, based on the increase in long-term cost to the program caused by improvement in 
life expectancy at Full Retirement Age. (Actually, pursuing a pervasive “balance the pain” 
approach they would divide the impact between Primary Insurance Amount reduction 
and an upward adjustment of the Social Security tax rate.) The widening gap between 
life expectancy for higher income and lower income retirees furnishes justification for a 
proposed reduction in the top band multiplier in the PIA formula from 15% to 10%. Other 
features of their plan are shaped in response to increases in earnings inequality. They 
note: “In 1983 ... 10 percent of earnings were untaxed because they were above the 
taxable minimum. In 2002, in contrast, the share of earnings above the maximum was 
about 15 percent.”36 The final factor influencing their plan they term “legacy costs” – the 
costs that must be borne by present and future workers because earlier cohorts of Social 
Security recipients were and are paid benefits in excess of those financed by their own 
contributions.37 
Two high profile Social Secuity plans put forward as part of more comprehensive deficit 
reduction proposals floated in 2010 reflected elements of the Diamond-Orzag package 
together with other components.38 Both included:  
• An increase in the maximum earnings subject to the Social Security tax with 
subsequent indexing aimed at taxing 90% of all earnings 
• A gradual reduction of the replacement rate for top earners 
• Future benefit formula adjustments to reflect longevity increases, in one case by 
indexing of the PIA formula, in the other through adjustment of both the age of 
earliest eligibility and the Full Retirement Age 
• Eventual extension of coverage to all newly hired state and local government 
employees 
Additionally, both 2010 proposals sought to improve the information and advice available 
to inform the retirement planning of future beneficiaries, so as to encourage both more 
adequate savings and later retirement. 
Changes that will solve Social Security’s financing challenge necessarily entail measures that 
can appear politically unpalatable. In comparing options and persuading the public of a 
particular course of action, having an understandable framework or set of criteria is 
critical. And the starting premise can be determinative. Some enter this policy debate 
with the conviction (not necessarily expressed) that the degree of income and 
intergenerational transfer embedded in this social insurance program is undesirable. 
This leads them to favor solutions producing a much tighter relationship between each 
worker’s pay-in and his or her ultimate lifetime benefits. Others would have the 
program do even more for low earnings workers. These groups are not likely to favor 
the same set of changes for achieving program solvency. 
G. Social Security and gender 
Notwithstanding its formal gender neutrality, Social Security is a different program for 
men and women. That means that significant program changes are likely to have a 
differential impact. 
To begin, women live longer than men. That is not only true for those generations 
currently 65 and older; it appears almost certain to hold true for the generations 
following directly behind. The longevity gap is projected to narrow somewhat in the 
years ahead but not disappear. 
Figure 439 
 
The preceding chart (Figure 4) shows the declining ratio of men to women in 
ascending age cohorts. The most recent life expectancy tables show a 4.1 year gender 
difference for 40-year-olds and an even larger gap of  4.4 years at age 30. (The 
disparity is greater for blacks than for the population generally.)40 
It follows as a straightforward consequence that Social Security benefits paid to those 
over age 60 (widow and widower benefits) or those over age 62 (Old-Age Insurance or 
retirement benefits and spouse benefits) are received by more women than men. The 
percentage of women on the Social Security benefit rolls increases by age in close parallel 
with the chart above.41 And since these are benefits one cannot outlive, indeed, benefits that 
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are adjusted upward over time as living costs rise, differences in longevity translate directly 
into differences in benefits received. On average, the same monthly benefit amount will 
have greater value for a woman than for a man because it will be paid over several more 
years. But, of course, men and women do not, on average, have the same benefit amounts. 
The average monthly benefit paid senior women in December 2010 (averaging across all 
benefit types) was 74.5% that paid senior men.42 A principal source of the disparity is 
obvious. Because of their direct tie to the individual’s history of earnings over an 
extended period, Social Security’s retirement benefit amounts are dramatically lower for 
women than they are for men. In December 2010, the average retired worker benefit 
for women was 77.3% that for men.43 Over the years during which current beneficiaries 
compiled their Social Security earnings records, women received lower earnings than 
men, were more frequently engaged in part-time rather than full-time employment, 
and spent more years out of covered employment.44 (Social Security retirement benefits 
are based on indexed covered earnings over a 35-year period. With a period of 
potential work that can stretch from before age 22 past age 62, this formula will exclude 
five or more low or no earnings years.  However, a lengthy period devoted to child 
rearing, care for adult relatives, or other non-market activity will have a direct impact on 
benefit amount.) 
Since past and present marital relationships can be the basis for Social Security 
benefits, the distribution of marital status among those close to or past the age of 
eligibility is significant, with death of one partner becoming an factor of growing 
importance as age increases. 
Because of their greater longevity and the typical age gap between spouses45 women 
are far more likely than men to fall in the widowed category. Over half the women 75 
and over are widows, as are close to a quarter of those 65-74.46 The percentage of seniors 
living alone increases with age. In the population 65 and over, the number of women 
living alone is 2.5 times the number of men who do. In the population 85 and over, the 
ratio is 3:1.47 
Implications of these demographic realities for Social Security revision 
Due to increased labor force participation the percentage of women above Social 
Security’s age of eligibility receiving retired worker benefits has grown steadily.48 
While this has reduced the number of women receiving spouse benefits alone, 
because of the terms on which benefits are available to spouses, particularly the formula 
which furnishes a widow total benefits that are equal to those of her deceased husband, the 
principal effect has been an increase in the number of “dually entitled” beneficiaries. 
These are individuals receiving retirement benefits on their own account plus a spouse 
benefit supplement. See Figure 5. 
 Figure 549 
 
Women who have never been married or whose marriage or marriages ended in divorce 
before lasting 10 years are not eligible for wife or widow benefits. Nor are those 
whose own retired worker benefits exceed those payable on the account of their 
deceased husband or former husband. It is the case, however, that those groups represent 
a small, though growing, fraction of older women. The greater number of women 
currently receiving retired worker benefits but no spousal supplement are those with a 
living husband (or former husband). For them it is either the continued earnings of that 
husband or the amount of their own retirement benefits that precludes receipt of wife 
benefits. In short, these are women who will in future years, more likely than not, become 
dually entitled – when they are widowed, if not before. The average benefit paid to 
women receiving widow benefits (either widow benefits alone or, more dramatically still, 
widow benefits along with their own retired worker benefits) is substantially higher than that 
for women receiving only a retired worker benefit.50 
In sum, any shift of retirement benefits and their spousal derivatives from the current 
progressive benefit program to a more strictly contributory scheme would 
disproportionately disadvantage women. Since women are, on average, more totally 
dependent then men on Social Security, prospective benefit reductions will seemingly 
have greater impact on them. Furthermore, treatment of marriage and divorce, as well as the 
existence and terms of spouse survivorship rights, by Social Security and within any new 
personal account scheme has particular importance for women. 
Nonetheless, as important as spouse and surviving spouse benefits are to older women 
as a class and even to many of the most vulnerable among them, the law governing 
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allocation of those benefits (that is the eligibility rules and the formulae setting th
amount) is rife with arbitrariness and inequity. To observe that abolition or even 
dramatic curtailment of spouse benefits would have serious negative consequences for 
women is not to embrace the statu
H. Social Security and race 
Social Security can be conceived of as consisting of three components: a) one providing 
annuities to retired workers and their surviving spouses, if any; b) one providing life 
insurance to younger workers with families; and c) one insuring against an interruption 
of employment income due to the onset of physical or mental impairments. The relative 
importance of these components is quite different for blacks, other minorities, and white
Of the whites receiving Social Security benefits in 2009, nearly eight in ten were retired 
workers, spouses of retired workers, or surviving spouses.51 Nearly seven in ten ne
benefits awarded whites that year fell in those categories. The comparable figure for 
blacks was fewer than five in ten.52 Death and disability strike young black workers
disproportionately with the result that more than 40% of the Social Security benefits 
awarded blacks in 2009 were based on disability. Nearly one in ten went to children of 
deceased workers.53 The comparable figures for whites were significantly lower. Bla
who comprise 13% of the working-age population, are 17% of Disability Insurance 
recipients. Black children comprise 15% o
the recipients of child survivor benefits.  
Assertions that minorities are disadvantaged by Social Security typically focus 
on Social Security’s retirement piece, arguing that since minorities have shorter life 
expectancies on average they receive smaller returns. During the height of the 2005 
press for action on President George W. Bush’s Social Security plan, it was reported th
“White House official and Republican strategists” began “a push to persuade African-
Americans and Hispanics that Social Security, long thought to be of benefit to them, is
bad deal.”55  In the context of a campaign for a personal account “carve out” this was 
misleading. To begin, the earnings gap between minority and majority workers is large, 
and the progressive benefit structure of Social Security delivers, on average, higher returns 
to any group with lower incomes. When one adds in the disability and survivors benef
components of Social Security, it becomes very difficult to make the case that Social 
Security
I. Other groups with disti
1. Young, old, and in-between 
Those who reached retirement age in the early 1980s received a large net transfer.
Members of that cohort who are still alive continue to do so. Their benefit levels 
substantially exceed any pensions their contributions plus interest would have funded. 
That was not true for the cohort reaching retirement age in 1990 nor is it true for thos
retiring this year or ten years from now. Under current law workers born after 1936 
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are, on average, scheduled to receive benefits that represent less than a market rate 
return on their tax contributions.56 Issues of intergenerational transfer and fairness 
surround all options for Social Security’s future. Consider, for example, how the option 
of leaving the current law in place unchanged would affect those currently forty-six and 
younger (i.e. born after 1966 and hitting the age of 67 in 2033 or later). After paying t
same levels of tax as their parents’ generation now in their sixties this younger group
would retire to benefits 25 percent or so below the nominal amount held out by today’s 
statutory formula on account of 
retirement and thereafter.57 
Concern about disrupting the plans of those with relatively few years before 
retirement and related political considerations lead most solvency proposals to ex
not only current recipients but older workers as well from benefit adjustments. Such 
restraint inevitably shifts more of the burden of change onto younger coh
2. High-earnings, medium-earnings, and low-earnings workers 
On both its tax and benefit sides Social Security treats higher income workers and 
lower income workers differently. Its tax bite is lighter for those whose earnings exceed 
the annual earnings cap ($106,800 for 2012) and those for whom earnings are not the sole 
source of income – groups that have a lot of overlap. On the other hand, these regressive 
features are counterbalanced by a benefit formula that provides better replacement rates 
for low than for medium earnings history retirees, and better replacement rates for those
with average earnings histories than for those with high
treatment of benefits reflects a similar progressive tilt. 
Changes to Social Security designed to increase revenues or reduce long-term benefits
almost invariably threaten the current balance between equity (com
II. A Possible Fundamental Change – Personal Accounts 
A core element of all plans put forward by the Bush Administration was the inclusion 
of voluntary personal accounts. (This was a requirement President Bush laid on his 20
commission.) For a worker electing to establish such an account the idea was that there 
would be a Social Security offset (sometimes referred to as a “carve out”), i.e. the worke
would pay a reduced Social Security tax and ultimately receive reduced Social Secu
retirement benefits. (Other plans have proposed adding government encouraged and 
administered personal accounts on top of Social Security, a very different matter.) 
There are, of course, threshold questions such as whether some form of government-
induced, regulated, and administered personal retirement account system should be 
added to Social Security either on top of or as a partial substitute for current benefits.
There is the further question whether such a change is desirable in the context of concer
over the program’s long-term solvency. (Few proponents of personal accounts would 
contend that they represent a near term solution to the solvency problem.) Personal 
accounts are viewed variously as: a) an important component of any solvency solution 
that includes prospective benefit reduction, b) a sideshow or distraction, or c) a step in the 
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wrong direction. In addition to the fundamental questions surrounding any prop
personal accounts to Social Security are numerous critical matters of detail.58 
Of particular importance to the future of Social Security are issues concerning the 
interaction between personal accounts and “trad
details of any personal account scheme include: 
• If it is voluntary, what does voluntary mean? Can the individual worker decide
whether to allocate sums to a personal account each year (and if so how much) 
or are these to be
to be the latter. 
• How much can one allocate to this account each year? And is this allocation on 
top of or a “carve out” from current Social Security taxes? President Bush’s
proposed plan would have ramped up to an allocation of 4% of covered earnin
“carved out” of Social Security taxes, subject to an initial maximum of 
$1,000. The 2001 commission report offered three different plans: Model 1 
(2% of covered earnings), Model 2 (4% of covered earnings subject to a $1,000 
cap), and Model 3 (a worker contribution of 1% of covered earnings on top o
Social Security tax, to be matched by a Government contribution of 2.5%). 
• How are traditional Social Security retirement benefits to be adjusted for those 
who have personal accounts? The dominant approach being discussed in 200
consisted of an offset (often termed a “clawback”) based on a hypothetical or
“shadow” account. At the time for calculation of Social Security benefits the 
sums diverted to the individual’s personal account increased by some stipulat
interest rate compounded would be converted into a hypothetical annuity. The 
amount of that hypothetical annuity would then be subtracted from the person’s
Social Security benefit. (If you think the current benefi
understand, consider trying to work this one through.) 
With a voluntary account scheme workers would have to understand all of this well 
enough to decide whether to participate or leave the full amount of their contribut
within Social Security. The percentage rate underlying the clawback is a critical 
parameter. The lower it is set the more attractive personal accounts will seem (thus, 
increasing the incentive for workers to establish one), but lower rates also mean reduce
long-term savings to the Social Security system through the addition of personal 
accounts. If the rate is set lower than the yield of the federal bonds held by the Social 
Security trust funds, the difference can fairly be viewed as an implicit subsidy of personal 
accounts and at odds with the “higher return” rationale for such a plan. The clawback 
in the proposal the Bush White House was pursuing used an interest rate of 3% above
inflation. The three options set out in the 2001 Commission report 
(Model 1), 2% (Model 2), and 2.5% (Model 3) above inflation. 
A person electing to establish a personal account would receive higher total benef
and only if the personal account realized a better net return than assumed in the 
clawback shadow account. One careful study concluded that a significant fracti
personal accounts would not be likely to achieve sufficient returns to offset the 
correspon
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Other important features of any personal account plan include details of administration, 
fees, and the permitted range of investment choices. The closest existing approximation 
of the scheme President Bush had in mind is the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) available to 
federal employees and members of the military.60 The TSP is, however, a 
supplementary personal account program not an offset to federal pensions or Social 
Security. Moreover, while it may offer a relevant model, there are numerous dimensions 
for disagreement, discussion, and, if implemented, individual decision-making. Less 
conspicuous during the past “personal account” debate were a series of “ownership” 
questions. 
A. Spousal rights 
Spouse benefits are an important, if seriously flawed, feature of Social Security. 
Benefits paid over half of all women recipients include at least a portion based on a 
past or present marital relationship. What rights would a noncontributing spouse have in 
a worker’s personal account? If the recommendations of the President’s Commission of 
2001 were followed, spousal rights would be even more concrete than they are in the 
Thrift Savings Plan (where they are, in general, more robust than with private sector 
retirement pensions). The Commission Report stated: “All account balances 
attributable to contributions during marriage, and all earnings on account balances 
brought into marriage, should be divided equally in the event of divorce.”61 It went on to 
recommend that the personal account payout for all married individuals be in the form of 
a “two-thirds joint and survivor annuity” unless “both spouses agree.”62 
B. Pre-retirement access 
President Bush explicitly embraced his Commission’s recommendation on this point. 
A White House Document entitled “Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century” 
(February 2005) stated: “American workers who choose personal retirement accounts 
would not be allowed to make withdrawals from, take loans from, or borrow against their 
accounts prior to retirement.” (Social Security’s evolving approach to the definition of 
retirement and retirement age illustrates the potential complexity of this seemingly 
straightforward principle.) The scheme did contemplate that if a worker died before 
retirement heirs would have immediate access to the account.63 
C. Payout options 
The 2001 Commission Report also recommended limits on the form in which the account 
balance could be withdrawn upon retirement, preventing the holder, in most cases, 
from taking any portion out as a lump sum.64 As noted above the rules governing 
payout options would presumably, in the case of a married couple, take account of the 
circumstances of both spouses not simply the account holder. 
D. Dealing with the immediate impact of the reduced Social 
Security tax (FICA/SECA) payments 
The reduction in Social Security benefits resulting from workers making payments into 
personal accounts (clawback) would take place in the future.  The corresponding loss of 
Social Security tax revenues would begin at once. The oldest workers permitted to 
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contribute under the Bush proposal would have been 54, eight years from the Social 
Security age of eligibility, twelve years from their Full Retirement Age under current law. 
Substantial reductions in Social Security payout as a consequence of private accounts 
would not have come until years later as younger workers hit retirement age. 
Meanwhile, every dollar going into a private account would be a dollar not available to 
cover program outflows. This lag between the revenue and benefit impact of personal 
accounts gives rise to “transition costs” (“investment costs” to supporters), the need to find 
additional revenue (or benefit reductions) for Social Security to replace the lost taxes. 
E. Implications for the non-pension components of Social Security 
As noted earlier, Social Security does far more than provide old-age pensions. 
Throughout the Bush-era political debate over personal accounts the implications of 
substituting personal retirement accounts for other portions of “traditional” Social 
Security remained unclear. Particularly unsettling was the seeming inattention to what 
this might mean for young covered workers who experienced an accident or injury 
preventing future employment (Disability Insurance) or who died leaving children, a 
surviving spouse, or dependent parent (survivors benefits). Social Security insures against 
such misfortunes through the same framework with which it provides a foundation for 
old-age income security. Currently, over one in ten new recipients of old-age benefits are 
not shifting from employment but instead transferring from Social Security’s Disability 
Insurance program.65 Approximately one out of five individuals who receive Social 
Security payments are persons other than the worker on whose earnings those payments 
are based (20.8%). And those payments total over one-fifth of the annual distribution of 
benefits by the program. (20.4%).66 Vague assurances that the changes proposed for the 
program’s old-age benefits would not affect these other elements were ultimately 
unpersuasive because of how integrally Social Security’s different benefits are linked.67 
The same benefit formula and similar coverage thresholds apply across all program 
components. It is nearly impossible to reform Social Security’s old-age pension without 
also attending to disability, dependents, and survivors benefits. Furthermore, given the 
very limited political space available for adjusting Social Security’s future revenues and 
future commitments in pursuit of long-term solvency and sustainability, it seems 
unwise to ignore revision of these non-pension components at the same time. 
III. Possible Changes That Would Address Social Security’s 
Long-Term Fiscal Imbalance 
As suggested above, standing alone any personal account scheme that involves an 
immediate reduction in Social Security tax payments increases rather than diminishes 
the imbalance between the program’s projected revenues and projected payout for a 
period of several decades. The benefit reductions from elections of personal accounts lie 
too far in the future to mitigate the negative effects of the program’s shift from surplus 
generator to net payor around 2021 (or whatever the cash flow reversal year turns out to 
be) or the exhaustion of the program’s nominal reserves around 2033. Consequently, if 
it is to address the solvency problem, a personal account proposal must be bundled with 
some combination of net downward adjustment of the program’s benefit provisions 
(beyond those accompanying payments into personal accounts) and revenue increases. 
During the period he was actively pursuing Social Security revision, President Bush 
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ruled out a prospective tax rate increase (though apparently not raising or removing the cap 
on earnings subject to the tax). From the start, his administration’s emphasis was on the 
benefit side. 
A. Reducing future benefit payments 
1. Price indexing replacing earnings indexing 
President Bush never got to the point of tabling a specific solvency plan, the Model 2 
scheme presented by his 2001 commission, which most closely resembled his personal 
account proposal, provides an example of the kind of the program adjustments that might 
have been bundled with it. In that model the principal source of prospective benefit 
reduction was a shift in the PIA formula. For the current earnings indexing, it 
substituted price indexing. In all likelihood it would have shielded those 55 and older 
from the change, but for younger workers have operated on the current Primary Insurance 
Amount (PIA) formula of percentage multipliers. Here is how a footnote in the 2001 
Commission Report explained this solution: “[T]he policy would be implemented by 
multiplying the PIA bend point factors (the bend points would remain indexed to wages) 
by the ratio of the Consumer Price Index to the Average Wage Index in successive 
years.”68 
As presented by the Commission this would not constitute a “benefit reduction” since 
the revised formula would still generate benefits for future retirees with the same 
“purchasing power” or better in comparison with those received by present 
beneficiaries. In the Commission’s words: “The new price-indexing policy slows the 
growth in future benefits. But, it ensures that future retirees will receive inflation-
adjusted benefits that are at least as high as the benefits received by today’s retirees.”69 
This approach rejects the policy of maintaining stable replacement rates or ratios that 
underlies the “decoupled” benefit formula enacted in 1977. Measured in replacement rate 
terms the change would have constituted a major reduction for future retirees. Rather than 
providing retirement benefits in a relatively stable ratio to pre-retirement earnings (albeit 
ratios that are different for those at different earnings levels) this change would lead to 
steadily declining ratios – assuming, of course, that wages continue to grow faster 
than prices. Proponents argue that earnings-indexing represents unsustainable benefit 
growth and a shift to price-indexing, since it provides future retirees with benefits of 
comparable purchasing power, is not a benefit cut.70 
Low-income workers would, of course, be most threatened by a change of this sort. 
Anticipating the concern, the Commission’s Model 2 package included an increase in the 
minimum benefit for steadily employed low-income workers “relative to the price indexed 
benefit level.” Its target was a benefit significantly above the poverty level for “a 30-
year minimum wage worker.” 
One member of the 2001 Commission, Robert Pozen, achieved visibility in March of 
2005 with a plan he labeled “progressive indexation.” It would have retained wage 
indexing for low-earnings workers, shifted to price indexing for the highest group, and 
employed a blend of the two for those in the middle.71 
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2. Alternative avenues toward fiscal relief through reducing benefits for 
future retirees 
Other forms of future benefit reduction receiving attention during recent Social Security 
policy debates include: a) continuing the upward adjustment of Full Retirement Age 
beyond age 67 and/or speeding up the increase to 67, and b) automatically decreasing the 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) as life expectancies increase (longevity indexing). 
Additional options are: a) shifting to a less generous and arguably more accurate annual 
cost-of-living adjustment, b) changing the PIA formula to include more years, c) 
reducing the multipliers in the PIA formula for the top band(s). 
B. Increasing program revenues 
The balanced proposal advanced in the book by Diamond and Orszag72 includes tax rate 
increases, which as noted above President Bush categorically ruled out and have not 
figured in more recent plans. Many have urged bringing those state and local government 
employees who still remain outside Social Security under the program. Other options 
including raising or removing the cap on the range of earnings subject to the Social 
Security tax (with or without including those earnings in the benefit formula) and 
increasing the amount of Social Security benefits subject to the income tax. 
Finally, there are general revenues (perhaps, drawn from a restored and reinvigorated 
estate tax). The two model plans in the 2001 commission report that achieved or 
approached solvency while adding personal accounts turned to general revenues to cover 
program short-falls. In significant part those short-falls were, under Models 2 and 3, the 
product of their shifting Social Security tax revenues from the funding of current benefits 
to advance funding of personal accounts. This allowed those supporting Model 2 to 
argue that these general revenue infusions might be viewed in loan-like terms: 
In order to maintain the ability to pay benefits throughout the 75-year period, 
additional revenue would likely be needed (in years 2025 through 2054 under 
the assumptions used for these estimates). The Reform Model would provide for 
transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury in amounts needed for such 
years. However, because of substantial expected cash flow surpluses later in the 
period, and beyond, these transfers could be repaid.73 
The Pozen plan (see III.A.1 above) explicitly called for general fund transfers totaling 
$1.9 trillion in present value between 2030 and 2078, estimated to produce a trust 
fund balance of $200 billion and positive cash flow by 2078.74 
IV. Other Program Changes That Might Be Bundled 
A. Surviving spouse benefits 
Two of the three plans put forward by the President Bush’s 2001 commission 
recommended a change in the benefits for widows and widowers, a change that would 
assure the survivor a benefit equal to 75% of the combined Social Security payments 
received by the couple while both were alive. No further details were furnished.75  
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Current law falls short of that amount. It provides somewhere between 66% (when death 
brings a shift from 100% of PIA plus a spouse benefit of 50% to a surviving spouse or 
retired worker amount of 100%) and 50% (the case where both spouses had similar 
earnings records and were therefore receiving near equal retirement benefits). These 
percentages vary, of course, if the spouses begin benefits at different ages. 
Important as the spouse benefit structure is for women, using it as the principal 
instrument for addressing issues of gender equality and benefit adequacy for older 
women has serious and growing problems. The equity issues are huge. In addition, 
because of declining marriage rates and the prevalence of divorce following fewer than 
ten years of marriage, it is likely that in successive cohorts of senior women, fewer and 
fewer will be eligible for these dependent benefits.76 Because these trends are particularly 
pronounced among black women, any enhancement of widows’ benefits will result in 
greater racial disparity.77 
Other program adjustments have the potential for improving benefits for women without 
tying that improvement to past or present marriages. 
B. A benefit increment for very old recipients 
Two plans put forward in 2010 as part of comprehensive deficit reduction proposals 
included a benefit increment for long-term recipients.78 The idea responds to the high 
levels of poverty among the oldest Social Security recipients, the majority of whom are 
women. Having outlived other financial resources, these beneficiaries are uniquely 
dependent on Social Security. 
C. An improved benefit formula for low-earnings workers 
Any package of changes that includes future benefit reduction poses the greatest threat 
to those whose earnings have little or no margin for additional retirement savings. The 
current Social Security formula has two forms of special protection for low-earnings 
workers: a) a PIA formula that provides higher earnings replacement for those with low 
average indexed monthly earnings, and b) a special minimum for those with long years of 
low earnings. Even so it generates benefits that fall below the poverty threshold for a 
single person household (65 or over). The gap is particularly pronounced for those who, 
often without choice, commence their benefits at age 62. Model 2 of the 2001 
Commission report, while generally reducing earnings replacement by a shift to price 
indexing, contained an enhanced special minimum for low-earnings workers, aimed 
ultimately at delivering a benefit equal to 120% of the poverty level to a 30-year 
minimum wage worker. Model 3 included a similar feature with a 100% target.79 Most 
subsequent plans have contained a benefit formula adjustment designed to assure 
minimally adequate retirement income to steadily employed low-earnings workers. 
V. The Framing of Reform 
Since the program’s birth, success at establishing the language and the concepts framing 
Social Security features and options has held immense political importance. 
Whenever hard choices about the system were thrust upon an administration and 
Congress, those who proved able to define the starting point and the units of analysis 
attained the upper hand. Since the political environment surrounding Social Security 
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finds cuts unpopular, if not inconceivable, finding a way to present change as stability 
provides enormous advantage. Success in framing the adequacy of future benefits in 
terms of “replacement rate” helped establish wage-indexing in 1977.80 The 
prospective benefit reduction enacted in 1983 was packaged as a gradual increase in 
what is now termed the “Full Retirement Age.” 
In 2005 negative public sentiment about “privatizing Social Security” led the 
Administration to insist that President Bush be understood as proposing “personal 
accounts” and opponents with equal persistence to characterize the President Bush’s plan 
as one of “private accounts” or “privatization.”81 The Bush Administration failed to 
build public or political acceptance of the terms or concepts within which his preferred 
package of changes could be viewed as not only palatable but desirable. The commission 
Bush established during his first term failed to reach consensus on a single plan or 
rhetorical/conceptual approach around which bipartisan support could be built. 
One basis for preferring “longevity indexing” over further adjustment of the “Full 
Retirement Age” is a belief that the terminology relates more clearly to a coherent 
rationale for ongoing benefit formula revision. Similarly, shifting to a different and 
“more accurate” measure of the impact of price inflation on beneficiaries should be more 
saleable than simply subtracting a percentage point from the current formula. 
A broad concern over the federal debt and the nation’s fiscal future now frames most 
discussion about Social Security. There can be little doubt that the topics are connected. 
However, the risk this poses is that enduring changes to Social Security may be enacted 
as part of some grand bargain over spending cuts and revenue increases. That may avert 
a federal budget crisis. However, it will, very likely, fail to do justice to the challenging 
issues embedded within this singular program, which touches the lives and household 
budgets of nearly all Americans. Social Security’s current structure is the product of 
over seven decades of incremental amendment. Most of those changes were enacted at 
a time when ample program revenue made it easy for Congress to deal with any 
apparent inequity by expanding benefits or removing restrictions. Many reflect 
assumptions about work, family composition, and the other financial resources on 
which individuals and families depend that are a poor fit with contemporary conditions, 
let alone those likely to prevail into the future. To shrink the notion of Social Security 
reform to the balancing of its long-term income and costs would be to throw away a 
rare opportunity to make other needed structural changes. 
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Appendix 
Social Security’s Core Components, Terminology, and Points of 
Proposed Adjustment 
This summary of Social Security basics draws upon the author’s Social Security Law 
reference work and related material, available at:  
http://social-security-law.wikispaces.com/ 
A. Program Revenues 
Under current law, nearly all revenue supporting Social Security comes from four 
sources: (1) Social Security taxes imposed on employment and self-employment income, 
(2) interest paid on U.S. Treasury bonds held by the two Social Security trust funds, (3) 
income tax proceeds derived from taxing Social Security benefits, and (4) reimbursement 
transfers from general revenues. 
(1)  Social Security Taxes 
Under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) both employees in covered 
work and their employers pay a tax of 6.2% on earnings up to an annual Maximum 
Taxable Amount. That cap on taxable earnings (which also limits the earnings counted 
toward benefits) is subject to annual automatic adjustment as national average earnings 
rise. The figure for 2012 is $110,100. While not, strictly speaking covered by FICA, state 
and local governments that have elected to participate in Social Security and their 
employees pay equivalent amounts. The Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) 
imposes a tax equal to the combined employer-employee taxes of FICA on the net 
earnings of self-employed individuals.  
Total revenue from these tax sources, often referred to collectively as the Social Security 
Payroll Tax, totalled $637.3 billion in 2010, 82% of program income.  The amount was 
reduced for 2011 (and is reduced again during 2012) by a temporary subtraction of 2% 
from the employee and self-employed individual rate, enacted as a stimulus measure. The 
legislation providing for that reduction called for reimbursement from general revenues 
to make up for the resulting loss in Payroll Taxes. 
The types of work covered by Social Security and subject to the Payroll Tax have been 
expanded time and again since the program was first established in 1935. Today, most 
work performed in the United States, as well as most work performed abroad by U.S. 
nationals, is covered. Work done in one's own business ("self-employment") and work 
done as an employee in someone else's business ("employment") both count. In contrast, 
forms of income that come to an individual without work, such as interest, dividends, 
gifts, and lottery winings, are not taxed. 
Possible Changes That Have Been Part of Recent “Sustainability” Proposals 
While private employers and their employees have no choice about coverage and 
exposure to the Payroll Tax, historically the coverage of state and local government 
employment has been voluntary. Today, the principal category of employees not covered 
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and, therefore, not paying into Social Security are those working for units of state and 
local governments that have opted not to participate. Bringing those workers into Social 
Security (as they have been brought into Medicare) would, over the near term, increase 
program revenues and only later and over time increase program costs. 
Other program changes contained in recent proposals that would increase Payroll Tax 
revenue include raising or eliminating the Maximum Taxable Amount. (The 
comparable tax supporting Medicare has no such limit.) Of course, the most direct 
approach would be to raise the tax rate, but there appears to be little appetite for that, 
particularly since, due to the temporary 2% reduction, the rate is already scheduled to 
increase at the end of the Payroll Tax “holiday” as it returns to 6.2%. 
Plans that include a private account component, either mandatory or voluntary, that 
would substitute for a portion of Social Security inevitably entail a reduction in near term 
Payroll Tax revenue in contemplation of an eventual decrease in program costs. 
 (2) Interest Income from the Assets Held by the Two Trust Funds 
For decades Social Security revenue has exceeded program expenditures. The 
accumulating reserves, held in two trust funds, generate a second source of program 
income. Those reserves are invested in specially issued interest-bearing securities of the 
U.S. Government. During 2010, these earned an effective interest rate of 4.6%, 
generating $117.5 billion in income, 15% of the total for that year. 
Possible Changes That Have Been Part of Recent “Sustainability” Proposals 
During earlier bullish days, there were proposals to increase the yield of the Social 
Security surplus by investing a portion of the trust funds in equities. More recent plans 
have not pursued the idea. 
(3) Income Tax Revenue Flowing from Taxation of Social Security 
Benefits 
Up to 85% of Social Security benefits are subject to the federal income tax. The revenue 
generated is allocated between Social Security and Medicare, with Social Security 
receiving the amount produced by taxing 50% of benefits. Only 3% of program revenues 
in 2010 came from this source, $23.9 billion in total. 
(4) Tranfers from General Revenues 
Historically, general revenues have played a very limited role in Social Security funding. 
Typically Congress has authorized general fund reimbursement only when it has 
legislated benefits or benefit credits not resting on earnings that had been subject to the 
Payroll Tax (such as those granted for military service prior to 1982). During the recent 
recession, as Payroll Tax reductions have been enacted to provide economic stimulus 
without any compensating reduction in present or future benefits, reimbursement from 
general revenues has been substituted for the lost tax revenue. General revenue 
reimbursement constituted $2.4 billion in 2010 (less than 1% of that year’s Social 
Security revenue). Reimbursement for the 2% payroll tax holiday throughout 2011 and 
2012 will increase that amount. 
Appendix - 2 
 Possible Changes That Have Been Part of Recent “Sustainability” Proposals 
A number of plans have proposed dedicating a discrete portion of the estate tax or 
restored income tax revenues to building up Social Security’s reserves. 
B. The Trust Funds 
By law there are two separate accounts in the U.S. Treasury into which Social Security 
revenues are deposited and from which benefits and program administrative costs are 
paid. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) fund covers monthly benefits to 
retired-worker (old-age) beneficiaries, their spouses, and children and to survivors of 
deceased insured workers. The Disability Insurance (DI) fund covers benefits to 
disabled-worker beneficiaries, their spouses, and children as well as the cost of providing 
rehabilitation services to the disabled. Both trust funds are overseen by a Board of 
Trustees. That board consists of six members, four who serve automatically by virtue of 
their positions in the Federal Government, namely: the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Commissioner 
of Social Security. The other two are “public representatives” appointed by the President, 
subject to Senate confirmation. Among the duties of the Board of Trustees is the 
submission of an annual report to Congress on the status of the two trust funds. 
C. Program Costs 
Nearly all expenditures covered by the two Social Security trust funds are for benefits. 
The funds do also pay the costs of administering Social Security, but these constitute less 
than 1% of total annual expenditures. 
(1) Benefits 
Total benefit payments during 2010 were $701.6 billion (against total revenue $781.1 
billion). At the end of February 2012 nearly 36 million individuals were receiving Old-
Age Insurance at a rate of $44.2 billion per month; 8.6 million were receiving Disability 
Insurance at a rate of $9.6 billion per month; and 11.2 million family members were 
receiving Auxiliary Benefits at a rate of nearly $9 billion per month. 
(a) Categories of Social Security Benefits 
The Social Security program provides two types of benefits for the worker whose own 
earnings have established entitlement: 1) Disability Insurance benefits, available to 
covered workers who become severely disabled, and 2) Old-Age Insurance (retirement) 
benefits, available to workers 62 and over who meet the program’s definition of 
retirement. Benefits received directly by the worker are sometimes called Primary 
Benefits. In addition to these two types of Primary Benefits, the Social Security 
program provides Auxiliary Benefits. These are benefits paid to children, spouses, 
former spouses, and parents of a covered worker under certain circumstances. Three 
different events in the worker's life can trigger such Auxiliary Benefits – retirement, 
disability, and death. Covered workers who have no family members falling into the 
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eligible categories at those times get no return from this element of Social Security 
despite having made the same Payroll Tax payments as those who do. Auxiliary 
Benefits received by children and spouses of Disability Insurance recipients are, like the 
primary benefits to which they relate, charged to the Disability Insurance trust fund. All 
others are charged to the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance fund.  
Both eligibility for Social Security benefits and the monthly payments to beneficiaries 
depend on how much a working person earned in employment and self-employment 
covered and taxed by the Social Security system, over a period of years.  
(b) The Connection between Past Covered Work and Eligibility 
Although the different types of Social Security benefits have somewhat different 
standards, all depend on some person (either the claimant or the relative on whom his or 
her benefits rest) having sufficient covered earnings to have attained Insured Status. The 
requirement reflects the notion, which the program has carried from its inception, that 
benefits are payable only to those individuals or families who have paid into the system 
through the Payroll Tax during a significant period of covered work. All tests of Insured 
Status are expressed in terms of Quarters of Coverage, requiring a certain total of 
qualifying quarters or a certain number during a specified period. The reference is to 
calendar quarters. A year of work can, depending on the amount and timing of covered 
wages and self-employment income, yield up to four Quarters of Coverage. The 
minimum amounts necessary to accrue four Quarters of Coverage for a year of work are 
set so low that most individuals with taxed and reported work exceed them by a wide 
margin. (During 2012 a total of $4,520 in covered earnings accrues a full four quarters.)  
(c) Covered Earnings and Benefit Amount 
By the time most people are eligible for Social Security benefits, whether due to their 
own retirement or disability or the retirement, death, or disability of a family member, the 
basic facts on which their eligibility and benefit amount calculations rest have been 
established for some time. That is because the benefit provisions look back across a 
working lifetime using the same definitions as were applied year by year during that 
period in the imposition of the Payroll Tax. Only ten years of covered work (forty 
Quarters of Coverage) during a career are enough to secure Insured Status for Old-
Age Insurance. On the other hand, Insured Status for Disability Insurance requires 
that there be recent covered work, which can exclude individuals who have ample past 
employment to support retirement or survivors benefits but have left the labor market for 
a period to care for children or adult family members or simply due to unemployment. 
The arithmetic of Social Security benefit calculation begins with the insured worker's 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). Those entitled to benefits start out with a base 
monthly payment that is a defined percentage of that Primary Insurance Amount. In the 
case of Primary Benefits that percentage is 100%. The PIA-based amount is, in some 
cases, adjusted depending on the age at which the person begins benefits. Further, if a 
beneficiary continues to receive earnings after applying for benefits prior to the 
individual's Full Retirement Age, earnings above a set annual amount will produce a 
reduction in benefits. 
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The Primary Insurance Amount is based on the individual’s Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings. That figure is calculated from the worker's earnings in covered work 
over most of his or her career, indexed in relation to increases over time in national 
average wages so as to translate earlier earnings figures into recent earnings levels. The 
indexing year used is that which is two years prior to the worker's Year of Eligibility. 
(That is the year in which the worker could claim benefits or in the case of survivors 
benefits the year of the worker's death even if benefits are not begun until later.) Not all 
years enter into this Average Indexed Monthly Earnings figure. The Social Security 
Act contains a formula that identifies a number of low earnings years (at least five in the 
case of a worker who has lived to age 62) that can be dropped before calculating the 
average. In addition, a Disability Freeze will remove periods of disability from the 
calculation. 
The Average Indexed Monthly Earnings figure is converted into the worker's Primary 
Insurance Amount by applying a series of multipliers. The Primary Insurance 
Amount equals 90% of a first low band of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings plus 
32% of a large middle band plus 15% of all earnings above that middle band. The 
boundaries between these bands, termed the Bend Points, are adjusted automatically to 
keep up with rising earnings. (For workers becoming eligible in 2012 the 90% band 
covers the first $767 of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings; the 32% band, from $768 
through $4,624; the 15% band, over $4,642.) This formula produces a Primary 
Insurance Amount that is more adequate for low income than high income workers. An 
alternative Special Minimum Primary Insurance Amount applies to workers with 
lengthy careers of low income work. Finally, under Social Security’s Windfall 
Elimination Provision, workers receiving public pensions based on work that was not 
covered by Social Security have their Primary Insurance Amounts calculated under a 
different formula that yields lower monthly amounts.  
In years after the initial Primary Insurance Amount calculation that amount and 
consequently all benefits based on it are subject to upward adjustment because of Social 
Security’s Cost-of-Living Adjustment or COLA. The adjustment, which occurs when 
the cost-of-living increases, is driven by the Consumer Price Index prepared by the 
Department of Labor. In general, the benefit increase equals the percentage increase in 
the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) 
measured from the third quarter of the previous year to the third quarter of the current 
year. If there is no increase in the CPI-W, there is no Cost-of-Living Adjustment. 
A cap on the total monthly benefits payable on the account of a particular worker, the 
Family Maximum, has no effect on Primary Benefits but can lead to the pro rata 
reduction of Auxiliary Benefits received on that account. However, benefits paid to 
divorced former spouses and, under limited circumstances, even current legal spouses are 
paid outside that cap. 
Possible Changes That Have Been Part of Recent “Sustainability” Proposals 
Schemes that would trim Social Security costs by modifying the benefit formula 
invariably leave current recipients and those close to the age of eligibility for Old-Age 
Insurance alone. For younger workers, recent plans have proposed reducing the 
multiplier in the Primary Insurance Amount formula for the top band, in some cases 
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with the addition of a fourth band. This focuses future benefit reduction on the highest 
earners. Some plans that aim to take account of future increases in longevity would adjust 
the PIA formula as life-spans increase. Private account proposals that seek their long-
term substitution for Social Security invariably provide for a Social Security benefit 
reduction based on the amounts placed in the envisioned accounts. 
Finally, reflecting the view that the current measure of cost of living increases overstates 
the true effect of inflation on beneficiaries, a number of plans propose replacing it with an 
alternate measure developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics known as the “chain-
weighted” Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. If enacted this would, in all 
likelihood, apply to current beneficiaries as well as future ones. 
While the layers of Auxiliary Benefits bestowed on spouses, former spouses, surviving 
spouses and parents, and children account for over 14% of Social Security’s benefit 
payments and presume family patterns that no longer fit the lives of many workers, 
adjustments in that structure have received very little attention in recent proposals. 
Some proposals that include forms of benefit reduction also incorporate benefit formula 
changes for particularly vulnerable populations entailing some increased cost. Examples 
include: a) increasing the Special Minimum Primary Insurance Amount so so as to 
provide benefits at the proverty level or more at least for steadily employed low-earnings 
workers and b) providing a benefit increment for those who have spent a very long period 
living on benefits (20 years after first eligibility, in the case of one proposal). 
(d) Age as Factor Bearing on Eligibility and Benefit Amount 
The eligibility requirements for Old-Age Insurance and Auxiliary Benefits for spouses, 
divorced former spouses, and suriviving spouses all include age thresholds. Surviving 
spouses (unless they are caring for eligible children) must be at least 60 years old. The 
others must be at least 62. However, those who claim benefits at the earliest possible age 
suffer a reduction in benefit amount. The full amount is available only to individuals who 
do not claim benefits until attaining their Full Retirement Age. That benchmark age was 
65 for beneficiaries born before 1938. Under current law it is increasing in steps for 
successive cohorts, but will plateau at 67 for those born in 1960 and thereafter. For each 
month of benefits received prior to Full Retirement Age the law specificies a percentage 
reduction (which varies among benefit types). In addition, continuing to work and receive 
earnings above a set annual amount prior to one’s Full Retirement Age produces a 
reduction of benefits. Finally, those who continue to delay claiming Old-Age Insurance 
after reaching Full Retirement Age receive a Delayed Retirement Credit for each 
month of delay up to age 70. The Full Retirement Age is also the point at which 
recipients of Disability Insurance are switched over to Old-Age Insurance. (Since there 
is a strong correlation between advanced age and disability, some of the cost savings to 
Social Security achieved by moving back the program’s Full Retirement Age are offset 
by increased claims for Disability Insurance benefits. 
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Possible Changes That Have Been Part of Recent “Sustainability” Proposals 
Pointing to continuing increases in longevity, some plans have proposed moving back the 
current eligibility theshold ages, even indexing them on an ongoing basis to changes in 
life expectancy. More common are proposals to continue the increase in Full Retirement 
Age for cohorts born after 1960. 
